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Fifty-third session
Items 18 and 90 of the preliminary
list*

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES BY THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

Letter dated 4 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the pronouncement issued on 7 May 1998 by the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of the Republic of Venezuela concerning the peace process in Western Sahara (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items 18 and 90 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ramón ESCOVAR SALOM
Permanent Representative

* A/53/50.

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ANNEX

Pronouncement issued on 7 May 1998 by the Chamber of Deputies of the Congress of Venezuela concerning the peace process in Western Sahara

The Chamber of Deputies of the Republic of Venezuela,

Considering that the Republic of Venezuela, based on its respect for international law and for universally accepted principles such as that of the self-determination of peoples, has been following the process aimed at the organization of the referendum in Western Sahara,

Considering that the referendum process carried forward by the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has devised appropriate methods for achieving this objective and has won the support of international institutions, as shown, inter alia, by the resolution on Western Sahara adopted by the European Parliament,

Considering that the Congress of the Republic of Venezuela, in line with the principle of peace, has supported and repeatedly called for United Nations initiatives to achieve peace in the region,

Agrees:

1. To express our support for and solidarity with the resumption of the activities of MINURSO in Western Sahara for the organization of the referendum in the region and for the establishment of a lasting peace;

2. To congratulate the European Parliament for having adopted a resolution on the subject that will help ensure the stability of international peace and security, which are among the purposes contained in the Charter of the United Nations;

3. To encourage the European Parliament to contribute, along with the United Nations Security Council, to the efforts to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion, including the resettlement of the Saharans under the supervision of international agencies and organizations;

4. To transmit the present Agreement to the Secretariat of the European Parliament and to Mr. Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations;

5. To publicize the present Agreement.

Done, signed and sealed at the Federal Legislative Building in Caracas on 7 May 1998, the one hundred eighty-eighth year of independence and the one hundred thirty-ninth year of the Federation.

(Signed) Ixora ROJAS
President

(Signed) Yamileth CALANCHE
Secretary

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Security Council

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S/1998/524
17 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1164 (1998) of 29 April 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to report by 17 June 1998 on the status of the peace process, with additional recommendations regarding the mandate, size and organizational structure of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) or a follow-on United Nations presence in Angola after 30 June 1998 and revised estimates of the cost of that United Nations presence. It covers developments since my last report dated 16 April 1998 (S/1998/333).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Despite strenuous efforts of my Special Representative for Angola, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, during the reporting period, no progress was achieved in the implementation of one of the last major pending tasks under the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex), namely, the normalization of State administration throughout the country, including in the four strategic areas of Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'Harêa, which have remained under the control of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA).

3. It will be recalled that, under the 6 March 1998 timetable agreed upon by the Government and UNITA, central authority was to be established by 1 April 1998 in eight localities, including the above-mentioned four areas. On the eve of this deadline, the UNITA leader, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, sent a letter to President José Eduardo dos Santos, in which he requested that additional consultations on the normalization process be held in these localities. The Angolan President responded positively and dispatched two members of the Government to Andulo on 8 April with a written reply expressing his readiness to discuss the modalities.

4. Although on 8 and 15 April 1998, high-level meetings for the preparations of the technical phase of the normalization process took place in Andulo and Bailundo between the representatives of the Government and UNITA, no concrete measures were taken. UNITA argued that the extension of State administration in

these localities would require more time in order to allow it to conduct a public awareness campaign among its supporters, and, once again, demanded the holding of further discussions. The Government, however, insisted that UNITA abide by its earlier undertakings.

5. To date, State administration has been normalized in 272 of the total of 335 localities envisaged. Apart from the areas around Andulo and Bailundo, delays in the normalization process in other localities are mainly owing to logistical difficulties, including poor infrastructure, as well as the presence of mines. It must, however, be noted that certain areas where central authority was recently restored are still unstable and the normalization process has been reversed in some of them.

6. The ruling party, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), held an ordinary session of its Central Committee on 23 and 24 April 1998, while UNITA convened a meeting of its Political Committee from 25 to 29 April to discuss the status of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. In the meantime, my Special Representative, in cooperation with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), met on several occasions with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, as well as with other representatives of the Government and UNITA, with a view to breaking the deadlock in the peace process, which has been accompanied by a serious deterioration of the military and security situation.

7. Furthermore, in an attempt to put the peace process back on track, my Special Representative presented, on 15 May 1998, to the Government and UNITA a "crisis resolution plan" aimed at overcoming the current impasse. The plan, which was endorsed by the Government and UNITA, as well as by the observer States on 19 May, envisaged full normalization of State administration by 31 May 1998 in the four localities mentioned above, strict verification of the alleged presence of UNITA elements throughout the country, the cessation of hostile propaganda in the Government mass media and an end to the harassment of UNITA members by the Angolan National Police (ANP). The plan also stipulated that, if either party failed to implement it, the Security Council would be requested to consider taking appropriate measures.

8. In an effort to seek regional support for his plan, Mr. Beye visited Zambia, Namibia and Zimbabwe from 28 to 30 May for consultations with Presidents Chiluba, Nujoma and Mugabe. On 30 May, at Mr. Savimbi's request, Mr. Beye, together with the representatives of the Troika, travelled to Andulo to discuss with the UNITA leader the status of the peace process. On the following day, the Vice-President of UNITA returned to Luanda to convey to Mr. Beye a message from Mr. Savimbi in which the UNITA leader indicated that he generally supported the 15 May plan, but presented new proposals which contained additional conditions. These proposals envisaged that the joint Government and UNITA technical teams would conduct their work in the four localities between 17 and 21 June 1998 and that the full normalization of State administration would take place by 25 June 1998.

9. The political climate was further complicated when Government representatives publicly rejected these new delays and warned of possible action unless UNITA immediately disbanded the military structure it had maintained in

defiance of the Lusaka Protocol. The Government's spokesman also threatened to declare the UNITA party illegal for violating the Constitution and to close down the UNITA headquarters which was installed in Luanda on 1 June 1998.

10. In the meantime, the Joint Commission acknowledged that the Government had recently exercised restraint on the ground in dealing with UNITA supporters, as well as in the mass media, but expressed serious concern at the lack of progress in the extension of State administration owing to UNITA's persisting delays.

11. The transformation of Radio Vorgan into a non-partisan broadcasting facility and the establishment of "Radio Despertar" are also experiencing delays. UNITA has complained about hostile propaganda in the Government-controlled mass media and hinted that it might be compelled to take "retaliatory" measures. Although the public information situation improved somewhat since 20 May, the dissemination of unverified allegations by the Government media has regrettably contributed to mutual mistrust between the two parties.

III. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

12. The reporting period was marked by a dangerous deterioration of the security situation in various parts of the country. Armed attacks against villages, local government authorities, as well as United Nations and other international personnel, have become an almost permanent feature in the reports received from MONUA. Acts of banditry, new minelaying activities, and troop movements have also increased. The recent incidents have resulted in the loss of many lives and in the destruction of property, as well as the displacement of thousands of civilians. These worrisome developments now affect 8 out of the 18 Angolan provinces and have seriously undermined the progress achieved in the peace process.

13. Although UNITA continues to deny its involvement in these often well-coordinated attacks, it is clear that many of them were conducted by armed elements who have remained directly or indirectly under UNITA's control. On 2 May, some 400 UNITA armed elements attacked a village in the Cacolo area (Lunda Sul Province), killing several civilians. On the same day, an Angolan truck transporting passengers detonated a landmine on a road in Benguela Province and was then ambushed by a group of unidentified armed elements. Such ambushes have become almost a daily occurrence in many parts of the country. On 4 May, a staff member of Médecins Sans Frontières was seriously wounded in Huila Province when armed elements fired at his vehicle, which was clearly identified as belonging to a non-governmental organization (NGO). On 10 May, the International Medical Corps base in the village of Val de Loge, Uige Province, was attacked and all the relief items stolen, while on 24 May, the compound of another NGO in Benguela Province was assaulted, looted and burned.

14. On 19 May, a MONUA vehicle patrol was fired at in the Calandula area (Malange Province) by a group of unidentified armed elements, resulting in several casualties. One Angolan was killed and one United Nations military observer and one civilian police observer were injured. In addition, during several recent attacks, especially those in N'Gove, Chicuma and Cabinda, MONUA

team sites were directly targeted; in some areas where United Nations personnel are deployed, the security situation has become extremely precarious. On 13 June, the United Nations team site at Luau (Moxico Province) was evacuated owing to the mounting tensions in the area.

15. According to reports, UNITA elements sometimes try to re-occupy small towns and strategic localities, including in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, Benguela and Huila Provinces, often using as a pretext the heavy-handedness of ANP against local UNITA officials. Some of the localities where State administration was recently established have been abandoned by the local population and government authorities for fear of attacks by UNITA elements. In addition, the activities of MONUA and humanitarian agencies are still being hindered by restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by UNITA in some areas. MONUA reported that the normalization of State administration had been reversed in over 30 localities, and that the Government publicly acknowledged that 17 localities had been re-occupied by elements allegedly belonging to UNITA.

16. On 26 May, the Force Commander of MONUA presented to the Joint Commission a report on the verification of the demilitarization of UNITA forces, in which he concluded that a large number of UNITA cadres continue to be armed. While not all of them may be under direct control of the UNITA leadership, their attacks, in particular in Huambo, Benguela and Lunda Norte Provinces, were launched in a professional and well-coordinated manner. At the same time, MONUA had confirmed the presence of armed "residual" UNITA troops deployed in formations in Huila, Uige, Cuanza Norte, Malange, Bié, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul Provinces. However, some acts of violence could also be attributed to isolated groups who reacted to harassment by ANP.

17. Some UNITA officials and sympathizers have also been affected by numerous acts of violence. UNITA claimed that seven of its members were killed by Angolan forces near Negage on 6 or 7 May. In many instances, gross human rights abuses, including the killing of local UNITA functionaries in Cuando Cubango, Cuanza Norte, and Lunda Norte Provinces and harassment of UNITA members, have been confirmed by MONUA. UNITA representatives have abandoned their offices in some areas because of real or perceived persecution by the ANP.

18. Recently, MONUA observed various movements of the Angolan Armed Forces, including in Malange, Uige, Huambo, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul Provinces.

19. In the wake of the attacks against United Nations personnel, MONUA had to suspend patrols and investigations in Malange, Huambo, Huila and Benguela Provinces for two weeks. However, following some improvement in security conditions, MONUA resumed verification and patrol activities, accompanied by additional tight security measures, including protection by the remaining United Nations troops. However, restrictions imposed by UNITA and frequent lack of cooperation from the Government and UNITA liaison officers have slowed down investigations in various parts of the country.

20. The repatriation of United Nations military personnel from Angola was resumed, as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 9 of resolution 1164 (1998) dated 29 April. The Zambian infantry company, together with a small number from the formed units and some military support elements, have already

been withdrawn. In view of the dangerous security situation in the country, I decided to postpone the drawdown of formed units until the end of June. The possibility of adapting the concept of operations to the new situation is also being considered. The remaining three infantry companies and small support units will provide minimum security to United Nations personnel and assist in verification functions conducted by unarmed military and police observers. The infantry companies will operate from six main bases, which are mostly located in Government-controlled areas, and would obviously have only very limited rapid reaction capability. At present, the strength of MONUA's military and police personnel stands at 414 troops belonging to three infantry companies, 302 military support personnel (medical, air, logistics and communication), 39 staff officers, 90 military observers and 336 police observers.

IV. POLICE ASPECTS

21. The civilian police component of MONUA (CIVPOL) continued, to the extent possible, to perform the tasks described in my reports of 13 March (S/1998/236, para. 18) and 16 April 1998 (S/1998/333, para. 15). Civilian police observers monitored the neutrality of ANP, and in collaboration with the human rights component of MONUA, investigated human rights violations and visited prisons and detention centres. Frequent patrols were conducted in an attempt to monitor the free movement of people and goods. CIVPOL has also been monitoring the security arrangements for UNITA leaders, particularly in Luanda.

22. With the increase in acts of banditry, the proliferation of weapons in the hands of the civilian population is one of the major threats to security in Angola. In this context, CIVPOL has been urging the Government to take urgent measures to disarm the civilian population in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol. Although the Government claims that it is conducting the disarmament exercise, its cooperation with MONUA remains inadequate. MONUA is not always informed of disarmament operations, which seem to focus mainly on areas formerly controlled by UNITA. CIVPOL's verification of acts of banditry, including attacks on MONUA's personnel and property and United Nations agencies and NGOs, is often impeded by restrictions and lack of cooperation from both the Government and UNITA. Regarding the training programme for ANP in internationally accepted police procedures and standards, including respect and protection of human rights, the ANP Commander General has appointed senior officers to discuss with MONUA the modalities of such a programme.

V. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

23. In the course of its promotion activities for the respect of human rights, the Human Rights Division worked closely with the Ministry of Justice to prepare its second national seminar on "The citizen and justice", and assisted in the establishment of local human rights committees, especially in Uige, Lunda Sul, Benguela and Cuando Cubango Provinces.

24. The recent military actions launched by UNITA elements have resulted in dramatic deterioration of the human rights environment in the country. At the same time, some ANP elements continued to commit serious human rights

violations, especially in areas where State administration was established recently, and during the disarmament of the civilian population. The abuses include extrajudicial executions, torture, rape, arbitrary arrest and detention. As a result of widespread impunity, most UNITA and government perpetrators of gross human rights violations are not brought to justice. The lack of access has also made it difficult to further investigate reports of extrajudicial executions and torture in areas under UNITA's control, especially in the Malange and Uige Provinces.

25. The judicial system continues to suffer from an acute lack of human and physical resources, which results in gross violations of detainees' rights. It is, therefore, a priority for MONUA's human rights component, in coordination with the Government and United Nations agencies, to enhance its programme of assistance aimed at strengthening Angolan judicial institutions. In April and May 1998, human rights officers visited prisons in Benguela, Cuando Cubango and Huambo Provinces and Luanda, and discussed with local authorities measures that could be taken to alleviate the severe conditions of detention.

VI. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

A. Relief and rehabilitation

26. During the reporting period, humanitarian organizations continued to register a rapid increase in the number of newly displaced persons, as a result of the high level of insecurity described in section III above. Despite the return of some newly displaced persons earlier this year, recent displacements have resulted in their estimated total number in Angola climbing to over 1 million.

27. In the tense security climate, humanitarian organizations operating in Malange, Huambo, Benguela and Huila Provinces had to suspend their activities temporarily and withdraw some of their personnel to provincial capitals, while reviewing the contingency plans for possible evacuation. At the same time, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit is assisting humanitarian organizations in building capacity to respond to the high level of insecurity. Until the security situation improves, priority humanitarian assistance in support of the returnees and their reintegration in some areas will be temporarily suspended. Some essential humanitarian programmes will, nonetheless, continue to be carried out in Bengo, Kwanza Sul and Moxico Provinces.

28. In view of the deterioration of humanitarian conditions in several provinces, United Nations agencies and NGOs are currently reviewing their rapid response capacity, while at the same time facing severe funding difficulties. Urgent funding is also required for the activities of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (US$ 11 million), the International Organization for Migration (US$ 3.4 million) and the United Nations Children's Fund (US$ 2.6 million). If no additional funds are received before the end of June 1998, these organizations will have to reduce their activities in the country drastically. Additional resources are also urgently needed for the air

transportation service managed by the World Food Programme (WFP) on behalf of the humanitarian agencies operating in Angola.

29. The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, visited Angola between 18 and 21 May 1998 to support the humanitarian community and review the role of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit in responding to the emergency humanitarian situation. He also consulted with the Government on ways in which it could effectively assume the lead role in the humanitarian field, and encouraged donors to contribute to the 1998 Consolidated Appeal, which has so far received a poor response. The Government and UNITA were informed that protracted humanitarian assistance was not acceptable and that donor fatigue could ensue unless the parties demonstrated political will to improve the prevailing humanitarian conditions. Both parties were also called upon to refrain from the indiscriminate practice of laying new mines. Grave concern was expressed about the safety of the field staff of United Nations agencies and NGOs during the period of drawdown of MONUA military personnel. In view of Angola's limited capacity to assume a coordination role in the humanitarian field, humanitarian support from donor countries is urgently required. Otherwise, as ever, the losers will be the long-suffering population of Angola.

B. Demobilization and reintegration

30. The United Nations has initiated discussions with the Government concerning the establishment of the preliminary framework for the demobilization of military war disabled of the Angolan Armed Forces, and the Government is expected to provide the United Nations with the necessary information about this category of soldiers. According to the existing plans, this vulnerable group will have access to reintegration projects initiated under the Government National Programme for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Military Personnel and to a pension provided by the Government. The target group includes approximately 6,000 persons and will require about US$ 2.5 million for related demobilization activities.

31. With regard to the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants, over 6,000 newly demobilized ex-combatants have been registered by the Counselling and Referral Service (SeCOR) since the end of March 1998. By early May, food had been distributed to more than 27,500 beneficiaries by WFP. The social reintegration programme has assisted in training social promoters and has launched more than 150 different quick impact projects benefiting 5,000 persons, provided vocational training to 6,000 beneficiaries and distributed professional tool kits to 2,800 demobilized soldiers. However, SeCOR and vocational training programmes funded by the international community are facing a severe budgetary shortfall, amounting to US$ 10 million.

C. Demining

32. Surveys by international demining NGOs aimed at gathering information on the locations of mined areas are being conducted countrywide. So far, the surveys have covered 12 of the 18 provinces. With regard to mine marking and

clearance, the achievements have been limited, given the size of the country, the security situation, the severity of the mine problem and shortage of financial and human resources. The project of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which is supported by the National Mine Action Institute, is being carried out to develop maps covering minefields identified for future marking and clearance. Efforts are also being made by the Institute to improve the coordination of all mine action activities in the country. However, the UNDP-supported demining programme continues to face major financial constraints. Some demining NGOs are also facing similar problems. Therefore, voluntary contributions from the donor community are urgently needed to pursue these vital programmes.

VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

33. Angola is experiencing an economic crisis similar to that in 1996, which led to the introduction of the "Programa Nova Vida" by President dos Santos. The country's macroeconomic problems are characterized by a recession, increasing inflation rate, high and fluctuating foreign exchange rates, inability of the Government to meet other forms of current expenditure except wages, and acute shortage of foreign exchange for regular business transactions, as well as the total absence of new investments in the country. The above-mentioned factors have been compounded by a persistent budget deficit.

34. The positive efforts made by the Angolan Government to reduce the high rates of monthly inflation achieved results largely through the non-payment of the Government's internal debt. Not only have prices of goods and services for the average consumer reached very high levels, but the country may once again be on the threshold of a new spiral of inflation. The latest information on prices indicate that monthly inflation rates for March and April were over 5 per cent, which could lead to an annual rate of inflation exceeding 64 per cent. Foreign exchange rates on the parallel market, where the majority of the population and businesses operate, and which are nearly twice the official exchange rate, have recently increased from 400,000 new kwanzas (NKz) to the United States dollar to 510,000 NKz.

35. The current economic difficulties have been compounded by the low price of oil on the world market. Though more discoveries of oil were made recently, it will take quite some time before the new oilfields become operational. The decline in the world price of oil from US$ 19 per barrel to about US$ 11 could have serious implications for the overall performance of the economy, balance of payments, and Government finances. With the current situation, the budget deficit for the first half of the year is likely to rise considerably. At the moment, only salaries are being paid by the Government. Civil servants do not have the appropriate logistical support to perform their daily tasks, which often results in a low level of productivity.

36. The recent mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Angola, which included officials from the World Bank and the European Union, allowed the Government and IMF to assess the overall performance of the Angolan economy and discuss the possibility for an IMF-monitored programme. Prior to the IMF

mission, the World Bank had undertaken a similar mission to assess the country's socio-economic situation.

VIII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

37. As indicated in my report of 16 March 1998 (A/52/799/Add.1), the proposed budget for the maintenance of MONUA for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 amounts to $140.8 million gross. Pending the submission of further recommendations on the United Nations presence in Angola after 30 June 1998, I requested the General Assembly for an initial bridging appropriation of $43.6 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $10.9 million gross, for the period from 1 July to 31 October 1998. A review of my request has been completed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee and I expect the General Assembly to adopt the financing resolution shortly.

38. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of MONUA to 31 August 1998, as recommended in paragraph 44 below, the cost of maintaining the Observer Mission during the extension period would be limited to the monthly bridging appropriation requested.

39. As at 15 June 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)/MONUA special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 30 April 1998 amounted to $89.9 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at 15 June 1998 was $1,530.8 million.

IX. OBSERVATIONS

40. Since my last report, the situation in Angola has continued to deteriorate quickly and has become critical. It is clear that this deterioration is attributable, for the most part, to the failure of UNITA to fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and to implement the well-balanced plan which my Special Representative offered to the parties on 15 May. Continued procrastination in the extension of State administration, and the new conditions posed by UNITA in this regard, undermine confidence in its leadership's commitment to peace.

41. Some of the recent statements reportedly made by Mr. Savimbi can only increase the very serious concern of the international community, which I share, regarding the current situation in Angola. In a meeting held in Bailundo on 6 June, the UNITA leader reportedly told his supporters that the imposition of additional sanctions would be considered as an attack against UNITA, to which it should be "ready to respond". According to some reports, Mr. Savimbi said that, as a result, he "would not be able" to hand over Bailundo and Andulo to the Government. At the same time, speaking at a press conference on 10 June, President dos Santos stated that it was still possible to save the Angolan peace process in accordance with the Lusaka Protocol and that his Government would continue, until the end of June, to work with the international community to seek a peaceful solution.

42. It is clear that developments in Angola are reaching a critical watershed. I hope that the adoption of Security Council resolution 1173 (1998) on 12 June 1998 will encourage the UNITA leadership to take the decisive last steps to complete the peace process and honour the obligation they assumed freely in November 1994. Clearly, these steps would be in UNITA's best interests and would open the door to its full participation in the future political life of Angola. To do otherwise would deny Angola another opportunity to attain the lasting peace which its long-suffering people so deserve.

43. I, therefore, join the Security Council in its strong appeal to UNITA to cooperate with the United Nations in the immediate extension of State administration through the national territory and, in particular, to the four strategic locations of Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'Harêa. I am also very concerned about the fact that UNITA appears to have retained a large number of troops, and would like to reiterate my belief that the conclusion of the peace process will not be possible without its full demilitarization. In the meantime, the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation should for its part exercise restraint and avoid any action which might further undermine the peace process. Needless to say, I am extremely alarmed by the deterioration of security conditions in Angola and deplore the acts of violence committed against the personnel and property of the United Nations and other international organizations which are providing assistance to the Angolan people.

44. In anticipation that the urgent appeals of the international community will be heeded, I believe that the United Nations should continue to assist the Angolan people in restoring peace and national reconciliation. Accordingly, if the demands contained in Security Council resolution 1173 (1998) are duly implemented, I would recommend that the mandate of MONUA be extended for two months, until 31 August 1998, and that the strength of MONUA be maintained at the present level, as described in paragraph 20 above. MONUA would continue to operate on the basis of the mandate and organizational structure outlined in my previous reports to the Security Council (S/1998/236 and S/1998/333). It would also be prepared to support, within the means at its disposal, the full extension of State administration, including Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and N'Harêa.

45. On the other hand, should it become clear that there is no political will to complete the peace process expeditiously, I intend to resume the withdrawal of United Nations troops in accordance with resolution 1164 (1998) of 29 April 1998 and to stop the deployment to Angola of the additional police observers whose presence was intended to enhance confidence between the parties and to consolidate MONUA's deployment throughout the country. It would also become necessary in such a situation to review the United Nations involvement in Angola.

46. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative and to all MONUA personnel, as well as the staff of United Nations programmes and agencies and non-governmental organizations for the courage and dedication they have demonstrated in the discharge of their mandate and for the excellent work they have done to bring peace to Angola, despite difficult and sometimes hazardous circumstances.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 10 June 1998

Country	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Total
Bangladesh	3	21	1	-	25
Brazil	4	15	2	-	21
Bulgaria	3	19	-	-	22
Congo	2	-	-	-	2
Egypt	3	19	1	-	23
France	3	-	-	-	3
Ghana	3	-	-	-	3
Guinea-Bissau	2	4	-	-	6
Hungary	3	8	-	-	11
India	5	22	8	138	173
Jordan	3	27	-	-	30
Kenya	3	-	-	-	3
Malaysia	4	25	-	-	29
Mali	3	19	-	-	22
Namibia	-	-	2	138	140
New Zealand	3	-	-	-	3
Nigeria	4	22	-	-	26
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	3	-	1[b]	-	4
Poland	4	-	-	-	4
Portugal	4	37	-	172	213
Romania	-	-	4	138	142
Russian Federation	3	-	3	130	136
Senegal	4	-	-	-	4
Slovakia	3	-	-	-	3

Country	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Total
Sweden	3	20	-	-	23
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Ukraine	3	5	1	-	9
Uruguay	3	24	3	-	30
Zambia	3	24	8	-	35
Zimbabwe	3	22	5	-	30
Total	90	336	39	716	1 181

[a] Including military police.

[b] A military specialist in the Demining School.



Map No. 4016 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS
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Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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17 June 1998
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IDENTICAL LETTERS DATED 16 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

1. At 11 a.m. on 1 June 1998, a patrol consisting of two United States military aircraft broke the sound barrier two consecutive times over the city of Tall Afar, Ninawa Governorate, in northern Iraq.

2. At 12.20 p.m. on the same day, a patrol consisting of two military aircraft also broke the sound barrier over the city of Tall Kayf, Ninawa Governorate, at very high speed, which caused damage to civilian buildings.

3. At 10.12 a.m. of the same day, a United States military aircraft dropped three heat flares over the Saddam dam area in Ninawa Governorate.

You are requested to intervene with the Government of the United States of America with a view to bringing a halt to these unjustified acts of aggression, which violate the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of public international law and threaten the sovereignty and security of a State Member of the United Nations. In addition, these acts alarm the civilian population, particularly children, the elderly and the sick, and the dropping of heat flares and the breaking of the sound barrier over areas inhabited by civilians cause considerable damage to agricultural and other private property by shaking buildings and breaking windows, causing debris to fall on civilians.

I reaffirm Iraq's legitimate right to seek legal compensation, according to the principle of international liability, for the damage suffered by the State, its citizens and their property as a result of these acts.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-17116 (E) 170698 170698

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/526
17 June 1998
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a joint statement by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, and the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, adopted at the conclusion of their discussions in Moscow on 16 June 1998 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

98-17122 (E) 170698 170698

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Annex

Joint statement by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, and the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic

The Presidents reaffirm their position of principle on the necessity of preserving the territorial integrity and respecting the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and condemn all forms of terrorism, separatism and armed activity which affect the civilian population.

In an effort to stabilize the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, the Yugoslav side announces its willingness:

- To resolve the existing problems by political means, based on the equality of all citizens and national communities in Kosovo;

- In line with this goal, to continue without delay the negotiations between representatives of the State and representatives of Kosovar Albanian political parties, which were begun by President Milosevic and Mr. Rugova, leader of the Kosovar Albanians. Negotiations on all of the problems in Kosovo, including forms of autonomy in accordance with internationally recognized standards, shall be pursued continuously according to the timetable established by the parties with a view to achieving significant and speedy progress;

- To refrain from taking any repressive measures against peaceful populations;

- As a means of strengthening confidence-building measures, to guarantee complete freedom of movement throughout the territory of Kosovo. No restrictions shall be imposed on diplomatic representatives of foreign countries and international organizations accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who wish to learn about the situation;

- To guarantee free access to the above-mentioned territories by humanitarian organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and to allow the unimpeded entry of humanitarian supplies into those territories;

- To allow the free return of all refugees and displaced persons on the basis of the programmes agreed upon with UNHCR and ICRC. State assistance shall be provided for the reconstruction of homes which have been destroyed;

- To the extent that terrorist activities are halted, to reduce the presence of security forces outside the areas in which they are permanently deployed;

- To announce the willingness of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to begin negotiations with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on receiving the mission sent by that organization to Kosovo and on the reinstatement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a member of OSCE.

Both Presidents stated their firm intention to develop multilateral cooperation in the interest of the peoples of the two countries and of peace and stability in Europe.

Moscow, 16 June 1998

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/52/956
S/1998/527
17 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 61
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-third year

Letter dated 17 June 1998 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 15 June 1998 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plûmer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Volkan VURAL
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-17142 (E) 180698

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ANNEX

Letter dated 15 June 1998 from Mr. Aytuğ Plümer addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 3 June 1998 addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations (A/52/930-S/1998/460), which contains allegations regarding cultural property in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Repeated allegations regarding the so-called "destruction of the religious and cultural identity" of Northern Cyprus have been amply dealt with in our previous communications addressed to you, most recently in my letter dated 9 April 1998 (A/52/872-S/1998/327, annex). Suffice it to say that it has been the Greek Cypriot side that has systematically tried to eradicate the Turkish-Muslim heritage of Cyprus, in particular during the "ethnic cleansing" campaign directed against the Turkish Cypriot people between 1963 and 1974 when mosques, shrines and other places of Muslim worship in 103 villages across the island were destroyed (a list of mosques and Muslim shrines destroyed or damaged up until 20 July 1974 has been circulated in the appendix to document A/52/366-S/1997/724 of 16 September 1997).

Today, the Greek Cypriot administration is still perpetuating a policy of religious intolerance towards the Islamic heritage in South Cyprus, where Ottoman Turkish architecture is under threat of disintegration as a result of total neglect. A case in point is the rejection by the Greek Cypriot administration of a proposal made by an undisclosed foreign national (of Muslim faith) residing in Paphos, South Cyprus, for the repair and conservation of the mosque in the Mutallo quarter of Paphos. According to the Greek Cypriot press of 23, 24 and 27 May 1998, this proposal has been strongly opposed by the Paphos municipality, the Orthodox church and residents of Paphos in general, who do not wish to see the mosque restored and opened for worship. This case alone demonstrates the hypocritical nature of the remarks made by the Greek Cypriot representative that the policy of his administration "is to protect and maintain all cultural, historical and religious monuments in Cyprus".

While failing to protect and maintain the Turkish-Muslim heritage in South Cyprus, at the same time, the Greek Cypriot side is doing its utmost to hamper the efforts of the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to secure financial and technical assistance from international organizations that would contribute towards the preservation of the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus.

Our authorities take pride in their continuous efforts to protect the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus, utilizing limited resources in the most efficient manner in maintaining and restoring all sites and monuments irrespective of their historical and religious origins. In addition, our authorities have also effectively employed a universally accepted method of preservation by putting historical sites into everyday use wherever applicable.

The Greek Cypriot allegations concerning the cultural heritage of Northern Cyprus are baseless and politically motivated. These false accusations are part of the ongoing campaign of propaganda aimed at perpetuating the myth that the Greek Cypriot side is the sole sovereign authority on the island. The Greek Cypriot administration should be strongly urged by the international community to cease forthwith such futile propaganda efforts and instead concentrate on making a positive contribution towards reconciliation by acknowledging the existing realities on the island.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 61, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ PLÜMER
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1998/528
17 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1998 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 12 May 1998, which I have received today from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

98-17134 (E) 170698

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Annex

Letter dated 12 May 1998 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088 (1996), I attach the sixteenth monthly report on operations of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) (see appendix). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Sixteenth monthly report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force

1. There are approximately 35,000 troops currently deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from the 16 nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and from 20 non-NATO countries.

2. Over the reporting period (21 March-20 April), SFOR continued to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance by means of ground and air patrols. Approximately 2,400 sorties were flown by combat aircraft, with the SFOR helicopter fleet flying approximately 194 hours. Deployment of SFOR troops in support of exercise Dynamic Response '98 began on 26 March. The exercise, designed to test the capability of SFOR to deploy strategic reserve forces into Bosnia and Herzegovina, continued until 7 April.

3. Over the reporting period, SFOR continued to secure the transmission towers used by Srpska Radio Television at Duga Nijva, Udrigovo and Veliki Zep in Multinational Division (MND) (North) and at Trebevic and Leotar in MND (South-East). On 13 April, the Commander of SFOR and Republika Srpska Prime Minister Dodic signed a Memorandum of Understanding which established procedures for the transfer back to the Republika Srpska authorities of the control and security of the towers. The transfer operation is currently under way.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

4. The parties remain generally compliant with most military provisions of the Peace Agreement across the whole area of operations. However, more Bosnian Serb houses in Drvar in MND (South-West) and Bosniac houses in Stolac, in MND (South-East), were destroyed in arson attacks over the reporting period, and, on 16 April, an elderly Bosnian Serb couple was murdered in Drvar. SFOR presence in Drvar was increased as a result, and the Office of the High Representative and the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) relieved the Deputy Mayor of Drvar, the Cantonal Chief of Police and the Cantonal Minister of the Interior of their duties.

5. As reported in the previous report (see S/1998/310, annex, appendix, para. 15) and as a result of pressure from the SFOR Commander and the High Representative, Bosnian Croat military units have now withdrawn from civilian sites in Drvar and Vares in order to facilitate the return of refugees. Over the reporting period, approximately 60 displaced persons returned to Drvar each week.

6. Over the reporting period, SFOR conducted a total of 315 military weapons storage site inspections: 102 Bosniac; 76 Bosnian Croat; 4 Federation; and 133 Bosnian Serb. Thirty-three anti-tank mines were confiscated from the Bosniacs and 24 hand grenades were taken from the Bosnian Croats. In accordance with SFOR policy, those confiscated weapons will be destroyed, after a period of time to allow for appeals.

7. SFOR monitored a total of 1,383 training and movement activities over the reporting period: 251 Bosniac; 56 Bosnian Croat; 112 Federation; and 964 Bosnian Serb. One training and firing ban was imposed on the Bradina Instruction Centre (Republika Srpska) from 3-23 April. The training and movement ban placed on the Bosnian Serb 701 Brigade in Trebinje was lifted on 10 April.

8. Over the reporting period, SFOR monitored 545 demining operations carried out by the Entity Armed Forces: 200 by the Bosniacs; 178 by the Bosnian Croats; 56 by the Federation; and 111 by the Bosnian Serbs. Both entities continue to demonstrate satisfactory compliance with the counter-mine campaign, and there are currently no bans imposed due to failure in that area.

9. Following the SFOR "Train the trainer" courses (which were reported in January), each of the Entity Armed Forces established and conducted their own courses for demining teams. The last such course ended on 27 March, and SFOR assesses that all courses have been conducted to a high standard.

10. Since the introduction of the current SFOR demining policy on 10 March 1997, a total of 3,481 anti-tank mines, 18,271 anti-personnel mines and 1,177 items of unexploded ordnance have been removed in 3,251 mine-clearing operations.

11. The amnesty programme for mines, ordnance and war-like matériel, which was launched in the first week of March under Operation Harvest, came to an end on 15 April. During the operation, the following weapons and ammunition were received: 2,000 small arms; 1,300 anti-tank rocket launchers; 82 missiles; 14,000 grenades; 6,000 mines; 509,000 pieces of small arms ammunition; 4,500 indirect fire rounds; and 2,860 kilograms of explosives.

12. Over the reporting period, 22 unauthorized checkpoints were dismantled: 8 in the Federation and 14 in the Republika Srpska. The identification cards of the personnel involved were confiscated and the incidents are being investigated by IPTF.

13. The Republika Srpska Police Anti-Terrorist Brigade remains subject to the control of SFOR. A training and movement ban remains imposed on the Brigade owing to its continued non-compliance with the SFOR Commander's instructions.

14. The Police Unit for the Protection of Persons and Buildings was brought under annex I-A of the Peace Agreement in February. On 2 April, SFOR carried out a compliance inspection on the 10 sites under the surveillance of the Unit in Pale. The operation was conducted without incident. Seven of the 10 sites were cleared, and the Unit is now guarding only 3 sites. The 62 policemen who were listed in Pale were reportedly all cooperative and compliant. SFOR has sent a letter to the chief of the local police, Mr. Savic, seeking clarification of the status of the 44 individuals hired from the disbanded detachment of the Unit in Bijeljina.

Cooperation with international organizations

15. Within its capabilities, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, working routinely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Office of the High Representative, IPTF, the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

16. SFOR continues to support the installation phase of the municipal elections through the OSCE Election Results Implementation Committees at national and local levels, and through the provision of a secure environment, area security and support to IPTF. Representatives of SFOR, OSCE and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe met in Sarajevo on 17 April in order to discuss election time-lines for 1998, operations and logistics plans and safety concerns.

17. On 8 April, in Prijedor, SFOR troops detained two individuals indicted for war crimes and ensured their transportation to The Hague. On 16 April, one other indictee surrendered voluntarily, in Banja Luka, and was transported by SFOR to The Hague.

18. SFOR continues to provide assistance to the Office of the High Representative in the field of civil air traffic, primarily through the development of operations at Sarajevo airport and the continuation of work to enable Mostar airport to open to commercial traffic.

19. SFOR continues to support the Office of the High Representative in its efforts to establish joint institutions, primarily through the provision of security, communications and liaison to meetings of the Standing Committee on Military Matters.

Outlook

20. Returns of refugees and displaced persons are likely to continue to increase tensions. SFOR will continue to monitor the situation in Drvar, Stolac and other sensitive areas, and will help to ensure the provision of a secure environment to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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17 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1998 FROM THE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 9 (b) (i) OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991) ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following the technical presentation to the Security Council on 3 and 4 June, I visited Baghdad from 11 to 15 June 1998, in order to discuss with the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, the priority issues in the various disarmament areas which remain to be resolved. As suggested by several members of the Council, I offered to engage the Iraqi side in a technical, scientific and objective dialogue with the Commission in order to work together on the outstanding disarmament issues.

The discussions were held in a cordial and professional manner, which reflected the new spirit of cooperation between both sides following the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretary-General and the Government of Iraq on 23 February 1998 (see S/1998/208).

As a result of the talks, the Deputy Prime Minister and I agreed on a schedule for work to be carried out by both sides during the next two months in order to try to resolve most of the priority disarmament issues.

I believe that if the Government of Iraq provides the full cooperation it undertook to provide, in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and Iraq, it should be possible for the Commission to resolve remaining issues and begin to formulate reports on its work pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991).

A report on the outcome of my visit to Baghdad is attached (see annex). I would be most grateful if you could bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

I stand ready to brief you and the Council, at your convenience, following my return to New York.

(Signed) Richard BUTLER

ANNEX

Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), on his mission to Baghdad, 11-15 June 1998

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) visited Baghdad from 11 to 15 June 1998. He was accompanied by the Deputy Executive Chairman, Mr. Charles Duelfer, and four Commissioners: Professor Benson Agu (Nigeria), Mr. Gennady Gatilov (Russian Federation), Dr. Roberto Sánchez (Venezuela) and Dr. Emile Vanden Bemden (Belgium), as well as a team of senior technical and policy officers of the Commission's Executive Office in New York.

2. Four plenary meetings, and two expert level talks, comprising some 14 hours, took place on 13 and 14 June. These talks followed a day of consultations with the resident staff of the Commission's Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre. The Iraqi delegation was led throughout by the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Tariq Aziz. He was supported by a large delegation that included Mr. Muhammad Saeed Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Amer Rashid, Minister of Oil, General Amer Al Sa'adi, Counsellor to the Presidency, Mr. Abdel Diaf Taiwiesh, Director of the Military Industrialization Corporation, General Hossam Amin, Director of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, as well as those officials responsible for various activities related to Iraq's proscribed programmes.

II. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE VISIT

3. The Executive Chairman's visit to Baghdad followed the Commission's technical presentation to the Security Council on 3 and 4 June 1998. After making a similar presentation to the Iraqi side, the Commission sought Iraq's cooperation to fulfil what the Commission assesses to be the necessary requirements if it is to be able to submit credible reports to the Council on the verification and adequacy of Iraq's declarations on its proscribed weapons programmes.

4. For that purpose, the Executive Chairman proposed to the Deputy Prime Minister that the two sides concentrate the discussions on the list set out in the informal paper presented to the Council on 4 June, entitled "Disarmament issues" (see appendix I).

5. The Executive Chairman made it clear to the Iraqi delegation that the Commission's list of priority issues contained in that paper included the major outstanding issues relevant to the conclusion of the disarmament work and that no other "hidden agenda" existed.

6. While not accepting the Commission's document, the so-called "road map", the Deputy Prime Minister allowed the discussions in Baghdad to concentrate on the priority disarmament issues identified by the Commission, in that document, but disagreed that all of them were issues of disarmament.

III. TOPICS COVERED

7. In the course of the meetings, the senior experts from the Commission made presentations on the status of the verification of the priority disarmament issues. The experts outlined to the Iraqi side the various problems encountered by the Commission in establishing a material balance of proscribed weapons, and in their clarification of these issues. This was due, in particular, to the unilateral destruction carried out by Iraq. The Iraqi side presented its own assessment on the status of the verification of most of these issues.

8. Much discussion took place over the importance of certain of the matters under investigation. The Deputy Prime Minister stated that the Commission pursued many trivial matters not related to disarmament that only delayed lifting the embargo under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). Iraq had destroyed its proscribed weapons, and the details were unimportant in view of the level of suffering in Iraq as a consequence of sanctions. The Executive Chairman pointed out that the Commission's work had been both prolonged and greatly complicated ever since 1991 because of Iraq's incorrect declarations; unilateral destruction; and policies and actions of concealment. There was often a lack of direct material or documentary evidence. Consequently, in order to fulfil its obligation to verify Iraq's declarations, the Commission had to use less direct methods.

9. The Commission's experts stressed that, of particular importance, were measures to try to verify the total amount of proscribed weapons produced by Iraq. While the Commission had had success in verifying destruction of known weapons, it needed to verify the total quantities which had been produced. In a number of instances, it had been found necessary to investigate details in order to develop confidence that the total picture was understood. As briefed to the Council on 3 and 4 June, the Commission had found elements of the Iraqi declarations to be incorrect.

10. In the missile area, the discussions concentrated on the accounting of missile warheads, in particular the results of the excavation and laboratory analysis of missile warhead remnants; the indigenous production of missile components; and the accounting for missile propellants. The Commission stressed the importance of documents to help resolve the issues in the missile area.

11. The Commission's concerns on the verification of those issues were discussed. On the issue of propellants, the Deputy Prime Minister said that the issue was not essential for the disarmament process; it could be addressed under ongoing monitoring by the Commission; and Iraq would not agree to its inclusion in any current schedule for work.

12. On the accounting for Iraq's indigenous production of missiles and for major components, Iraq reiterated its position that it had not achieved full

capability to produce, indigenously, engines and gyroscopes for proscribed missiles. Therefcre, accounting fully for such components was unnecessary. The Commission countered that such accounting was necessary due to the significant uncertainty surrounding that programme, including the lack of physical and verifiable evidence of the destruction of the components.

13. In the chemical weapons area, the discussions focused on the accounting for special chemical munitions and the material balance of equipment for the production of chemical warfare agents. The Commission's experts outlined some practical means to address the issues, including the provision of additional information and documentation by Iraq. Both sides agreed that quick progress should be made on these issues.

14. During the discussions, the Commission presented the preliminary results of the chemical analysis of certain excavated remnants of special missile warheads. The Iraqi side rejected these results. Both sides agreed to conduct further discussions on this issue.

15. While informed of the Commission's concerns, Iraq refused to undertake additional steps to clarify the extent of its attempts to produce the chemical warfare agent VX. Iraq stated that this matter was closed and that it was only ready to discuss the evidence available to the Commission of incorrect declarations on VX. The Commission stressed that this important disarmament issue needed to be fully clarified and further verification efforts undertaken.

16. In the biological weapons area, the Commission's experts presented a status report on the verification of Iraq's declarations. Particular emphasis was given to the problems derived from the lack of physical or verifiable evidence in most aspects of the biological weapons programme. Iraq stated that it had already presented all the evidence available to it, and that no additional information or documentation would be provided to the Commission.

17. Iraq once again declared that the biological weapons programme had been obliterated. It stated that it would not revise its declaration of full, final and complete disclosure. The Commission proposed a shift in methodology to focus on the munitions end of the programme. Iraq requested a meeting in Baghdad with the Commission's experts and additional internationally recruited experts to review again the entire declaration. Iraq further requested that this meeting should continue until it settled the outstanding problems. The Commission agreed to a meeting, including international experts drawing from those present at the biological weapons technical evaluation meeting in Vienna. The duration of the meeting would be at the discretion of the leader of the meeting.

18. The Executive Chairman also raised a number of additional matters of importance. He informed the Deputy Prime Minister that additional aerial surveillance was being initiated by France. Further capability was under discussion with the Russian Federation for the provision of an aircraft, if appropriate basing were to be agreed by Iraq. The Commission proposed that the Russian aircraft and its crew be based at the Rasheed Airbase, outside Baghdad, where the Commission's Chilean helicopter unit was currently located. This

would facilitate coordination and logistics for the Commission's various aviation assets.

19. The Deputy Prime Minister agreed that Iraq would meet with experts from the Russian Federation and the Commission to consider this matter further. While he welcomed aircraft from Russia and France, the Deputy Prime Minister demanded that the Commission stop using the U-2 aerial surveillance aircraft because of the hostile policy towards Iraq of the Government supplying the aircraft, namely, the United States of America. The Executive Chairman reminded the Deputy Prime Minister that, at the emergency session of the Special Commission, held on 21 November 1997, it had been noted that additional aerial surveillance, with additional aircraft, could enhance the Commission's effectiveness. Thus, the Russian and French aircraft were supplemental to the U-2. He said he would study the Deputy Prime Minister's request, but that his decision would be based on the Commission's operational requirements for disarmament and monitoring.

20. In relation to missile monitoring, the Executive Chairman reiterated the Commission's serious concern over the use by Iraq of certain key components taken from a surface-to-air missile system (VOLGA) and modifying them for use in a short-range missile system. These modifications could, in turn, enable Iraq to modify the VOLGA missiles into a proscribed surface-to-surface mode.

21. The Deputy Prime Minister stressed that, due to the sanctions, it needed to make the best use of its limited resources for its national defence, and that all the missile systems in Iraq were under the Commission's monitoring, which would allow the Commission to detect any proscribed modification of a missile.

22. The Executive Chairman took note of this position, but reiterated that, under the ongoing monitoring plan adopted by the Council in resolution 715 (1991), the Commission would not permit the use or modification of certain components in non-proscribed missile development. The Deputy Prime Minister did not accept the Commission's position.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

23. As a result of the discussions, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman agreed on a schedule for work on certain outstanding disarmament issues for the next two months (see appendix II). Several meetings were planned to be held in Baghdad between experts from Iraq and the Commission in order to address some of the issues. Iraq made a particular demand that select experts from China, France and the Russian Federation should be included, as well as the Commission's experts and other international experts for a review of the biological weapons declaration and a review of the chemical analysis of special warheads. Additional laboratory analyses, excavations and physical accounting of proscribed weapons would be undertaken by both sides.

24. The results achieved under the schedule for work would be assessed by the Deputy Prime Minister and the Executive Chairman during the next round of discussions, to be held in Baghdad during the second week of August 1998. Depending on the results of these discussions, further work could be agreed upon by both sides, before the presentation of the next biannual report by the Commission to the Council, in October 1998.

25. The Executive Chairman stressed to the Deputy Prime Minister that concrete progress on the priority disarmament issues would have a direct impact on the Commission's ability to report favourably to the Security Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991). The Executive Chairman emphasized to the Deputy Prime Minister that fundamental to this end would be the provision by Iraq of documents sought by the Commission on the priority issues. This has been deemed essential by the Commission, given Iraq's claim that it no longer possesses any other physical or verifiable evidence to support its declarations that it does not retain any proscribed weapons, components or equipment.

26. In virtually all instances, Iraq remained firm in its position that no relevant documents were available. However, in limited cases, Iraq would look again for documents. In one instance, Iraq refused to provide documents which it acknowledged having in its possession - documents previously shown to the Commission on one occasion - on the ground that Iraq had itself determined that the material contained in those documents was unrelated to the Commission's work.

27. While the schedule for work includes most of the priority issues identified by the Commission in its briefing to the Council and in its April 1998 report to the Council (S/1998/332), Iraq refused to include some of the priority issues which had been identified by the Commission. These included the extent of the VX production, accounting for proscribed missile propellants, and clarification of the concealment actions and policies by Iraq. On the accounting for propellants for proscribed Scud-type missiles, the Commission indicated that it did not accept Iraq's contention and that it would continue its investigation of this issue in parallel with the implementation of the agreed schedule for work. This was also the case in respect of the verification of the VX issues.

28. During the discussions, the Executive Chairman raised the matter of Iraqi concealment actions and policies and their impact on verification and monitoring. He stressed that the Commission considered a full investigation of this issue to be fundamental if it were to report to the Council, with a great degree of confidence, that all Iraq's proscribed weapons programmes had been destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless.

29. The Executive Chairman proposed to the Deputy Prime Minister that a special meeting be held to discuss, in particular, those events that gave rise to the Commission's concern on possible concealment activities by Iraq. The Deputy Prime Minister declined, preferring to focus on the schedule for work on the other outstanding disarmament issues and then, after that, to discuss the matter of concealment. The Executive Chairman stated that the Commission needed to continue investigating Iraq's actions and decisions to retain proscribed materials and associated documents, in order to verify that they had, indeed, ended.

30. The Executive Chairman reminded the Deputy Prime Minister that, while carrying out the schedule for work, the Commission would be engaging in its other activities and would pursue all the matters it deemed necessary to accomplish its mandate. The Deputy Prime Minister stated that Iraq would cooperate with the Commission.

APPENDIX I

Informal paper presented to the Security Council on 4 June 1998

Disarmament issues

Below is a statement of specific tasks and information, the completion and verification of which are necessary to the formulation by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) of a report, pursuant to paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) that, in its view, Iraq has completed the disarmament actions contemplated in that resolution. The achievement of this outcome will require Iraq to meet fully its obligation to provide access to all necessary materials, documents and information.

The preparation of such a report would also require the Commission to be able to conclude that concealment of proscribed programmes by Iraq had ceased.

Missiles

Warheads

- Completion of the warhead material balance
- Implementation of the recommendations of the missile warhead technical evaluation meeting
- Provision of the documentation requested in the Commission's letters of 4 November 1996 and 1 August 1997

Propellants

- Provision of the record of the unilateral destruction of propellants
- Full disclosure on propellant unilateral destruction activities

Indigenous production

- Establishment of material balance of major components
- Provision of supporting documentary evidence, in particular monthly production status reports

Verification and assessment by UNSCOM of the foregoing

Chemical weapons

- Accounting for special missile warheads
  - Provision of documents and clarifications on the production, filling and deployment of warheads

- Material balance of special munitions

  - Provision of verifiable evidence of the disposition of unaccounted munitions, including 155-mm mustard shells and R-400 chemical/biological aerial bombs

- Extent of Iraq's efforts to produce chemical warfare agent VX

  - Implementation of the recommendations of the technical evaluation meeting

  - Provision of documents and verifiable evidence to support its declarations

- Material balance of chemical weapons production equipment

  - Provision of information on the use and status of the equipment evacuated from chemical weapons facilities prior to the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

Verification and assessment by UNSCOM of the foregoing

Biological weapons

Material balance of

- Acquisition and production of

  - Materials and equipment

  - Agents

  - Munitions

- Destruction of

  - Materials and equipment

  - Agents

  - Munitions

Additional action required

- Provision of information and materials identified by the technical evaluation meeting

Verification and assessment by UNSCOM of the foregoing

APPENDIX II

14 June 1998

Schedule for work on outstanding disarmament issues until 9 August 1998

Missiles

Warheads

1. Completion of the verification of the warhead material balance:

(a) Completion of the warhead survey and excavation work at the destruction sites in Iraq by 18 or 21 June;

(b) Classification of warhead remnants and collection of data by the UNSCOM assessment team in Iraq (18 to 24 June);

(c) Completion of the UNSCOM analysis of the 44 warhead samples removed from Iraq by 19 June and provision of the results to Iraq by 22 June.

2. Review of the implementation of any remaining recommendations of the missile warhead technical evaluation meeting between 18 and 24 June, and agreement on any further steps needed from Iraq within two weeks.

3. A meeting between Iraq and UNSCOM on the warhead issues, if required (end of July (Baghdad)).

Indigenous production

An expert meeting is to be held in Baghdad in mid-July between the two sides to review the status of indigenous production (engines, gyroscopes, warheads), the material balance and the unilateral destruction thereof.

Chemical weapons

1. Taking additional samples by UNSCOM from soil and warhead remnants from the destruction sites as soon as possible.

2. Expert meeting to be held during the first week of July in Baghdad on:

- Available results of the chemical analysis of the warhead remnant samples;
- Results of the chemical analysis of the samples from the MSE VX dump site, including stabilizers. The results of the analysis will be provided to Iraq by 23 June.

3. Material balance of special munitions

155 mm mustard shells

(a) Clarification to be submitted by Iraq by 21 July on sites where 155 mm mustard shells were lost during the war. Iraq will give UNSCOM two weeks' advance notice, in case it would request deployment by UNSCOM of survey and verification equipment.

(b) Expert meeting on the accounting of 155 mm shells (last week of July (Baghdad)).

R-400 aerial bombs

Presentation by Iraq of documents on the accounting of conventional aerial bombs BRIP 400 (tail section) (first week of July).

4. Material balance of chemical weapons production equipment

Clarifications to be submitted by Iraq on the movement of the glassware shipping containers which contained chemical production equipment (within 2-3 weeks).

Biological weapons

Iraq-UNSCOM expert meeting on the BW file, beginning 11 July in Baghdad.

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NATIONS

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S/1998/530
18 June 1998

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BRAZIL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to enclose a statement of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, adopted in Lisbon on 17 June 1998 on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

As Brazil now holds the presidency of the Council of the Community, I would like to kindly request you to circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of Security Council.

(Signed) Celso L. N. AMORIM
Permanent Representative of Brazil

98-17259 (E) 180698

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Annex

Statement of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries on the situation in Guinea-Bissau

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, recalling the Declaration of the Permanent Committee of Consultation on Guinea-Bissau, reiterate their serious concern with the situation that continues to affect this member State of the Community and issue a vehement appeal for the rapid re-establishment of peace and the solution of the conflict through negotiated and pacific means.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries express their profound distress at the loss of human life caused by the conflict and their readiness to provide aid and humanitarian assistance in order to minimize the suffering of the people of Guinea-Bissau.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, aware of the political solidarity that is required by all member States and the close relations that unite them, will make every possible stride that may lead to the solution of the current crisis in Guinea-Bissau within the framework of our Community, thus adhering to its primary vocation, as established in its constitutive documents, of political and diplomatic consultation and reinforcement of the bonds of cooperation among its seven member States.

In that context, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries hereby declare their readiness to help provide a diplomatic solution to the crisis and their support for any initiative that may put an end to the conflict affecting Guinea-Bissau.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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18 June 1998
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 18 JUNE 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 18 June 1998 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the temporary nature of the oil-for-food programme.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

98-17253 (E) 180698 180698

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Annex

Letter dated 18 June 1998 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

I should like to inform you of Iraq's position on the draft resolution concerning the oil-for-food programme, which was submitted on 17 June 1998 by the United Kingdom, Sweden and Portugal for adoption by the Security Council.

The draft resolution submitted to the Council contradicts the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Government of Iraq and the Secretariat of the United Nations in that it ignores the fact that this programme is an exceptional and temporary agreement, as stipulated in paragraph 4 of the Memorandum. Similarly, the third preambular paragraph of Security Council resolution 986 (1995), which served as the basis for negotiations between Iraq and the Secretariat on the conclusion of the Memorandum, provides that this programme was intended as a temporary measure until the Council took further action with regard to the prohibitions referred to in resolution 661 (1990).

The Government of Iraq is surprised that certain members of the Council are intent on adopting the draft resolution, even though implementation of phase IV of the purchase and distribution plan began on 30 March 1998 and there is no longer any justification for adopting a new resolution on the subject. The efforts of some States to amend the draft will in no way alter the substance of the matter.

Moreover, Iraq has clearly fulfilled its obligations under section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the implementation of paragraph 22 of that resolution is now an urgent and overdue matter that cannot be disregarded by the Security Council in the light of the positive developments in Iraq's relationship with the Security Council and the Special Commission, the most apparent aspect of which was the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Secretary-General on 23 February 1998 and the agreement on the agenda for the next two months with the Chairman of the Special Commission on 14 June 1998. To change the oil-for-food programme from a temporary measure into a lasting and permanent arrangement based on the provisions of the draft resolution submitted to the Council is therefore completely unacceptable to Iraq.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq categorically rejects this attempt to turn the Memorandum of Understanding and the purchase and distribution plan into a permanent measure, and it strenuously urges that for phase IV of the purchase and distribution plan approved by the Secretary-General on 29 March 1998 should be the final six months of its operation in accordance with the oil-for-food programme in the light of Iraq's fulfilment of section C of resolution 687 (1991), in which case it is incumbent on the Council to apply paragraph 22 of that resolution forthwith.

I should be grateful if you would inform the members of the Council of this letter and have it circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Iraq